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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the near failure and ultimate success of the United Nations mission 
in Sierra Leone. This operation is an interesting case study as it followed failed attempts 
at regional peacekeeping, and in many ways mirrored them, but ultimately ended the 
conflict. This was the last operation the United Nations (UN) started before the Brahimi 
report and was effectively a tipping point for UN operations in general.  
This research analyzes the strategy and actions of the UN force as the situation 
progressively deteriorated to near total failure, and the changes made to both that led to 
the dramatic turnaround in a short period of time. The overall strategy of the UN mission, 
mandates and their interpretation, troop levels, and responses to threats are considered. 
The shift from a peacekeeping to peace-enforcement strategy and the simultaneous shift 
in tactics to favor aggressive response to threats earned the credibility necessary to deter 
aggression. This underscores the need to tailor strategy, mandate to the specific 
conditions on the ground, and allow the force the flexibility to adapt quickly. 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
Sierra Leone is often seen as a turning point for United Nations (UN) peace 
operations. From 1997 to 2000, Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) tried and failed to implement cease-fires and resolve the conflict.1 After 
Nigeria and the ECOWAS mission announced their plans to pull out in 2000, the UN 
launched a mission to replace it.2 This mission was initially unsuccessful, leading to near 
failure in May of 2000.3 Between May and October of 2000, the UN made significant 
changes to the operation and essentially started over. This re-organized mission was 
successful. By January 2002 the civil war was over and Sierra Leone was able to hold 
peaceful, democratic elections.4 How did the UN strategy in Sierra Leone change 
between May 2000 and October 2000 and how did these changes lead to stabilization and 
ultimately success of the overall mission? What are the implications of this for future 
peace operations?  
B. IMPORTANCE  
Since the end of the Cold War, intra-state conflict has greatly increased and now 
poses the greatest threat to peace and stability. The superpowers are no longer willing to 
prop up regimes to keep them in their spheres. Unlike the pre-WWII era, there are no 
                                                 
1 Adekeye Adebajo, Building Peace in West Africa: Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau 
(Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2002); Eric G. Berman and Melissa T. Labonte, “Ch 3 Sierra Leone,” in Twenty 
First Century Peace Operations, ed. William J. Durch, (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace 
Press, 2006), 141–227. 
2 Lise Morje Howard, UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2008), 303; Adebajo, Building Peace in West Africa: Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau; Adekeye 
Adebajo and David Keen, “Sierra Leone,” in Mats Berdal and Spyros Economides, eds., United Nations 
Interventionism, 1991–2004 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 256–261. 
3 Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace 
Operations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), 318; Roland Paris, At War’s End: Building 
Peace After Civil Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Adebajo and Keen, “ Sierra 
Leone,” 261. 
4 Howard, UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars, 303–305. 
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longer colonial powers seeking to claim weak states or pull them into a sphere of 
influence. The UN is now the organization most responsible for maintaining peace and 
stability in the world. The UN has struggled to answer the calls to do something about 
these intra-state conflicts. A series of failures and limited successes in the 1990s have 
shaken confidence in the UN and shown the need for a more effective strategy. Lessons 
learned from Sierra Leone could be used to improve strategy in future peace operations. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
There is a great deal of literature that focuses on peace operations. Some studies 
suggest that peacekeepers make peace more likely to last,5 while even those that doubt 
the long-term effectiveness of peacekeeping have noted that peacekeepers make 
settlements more likely and recurrences of violence less severe.6 The most recent 
generation of research stresses a whole-of-government approach that for the most part 
includes aspects of security, socio-economic, governance, and truth and reconciliation, in 
response to the total breakdown of state institutions that is now common in post-conflict 
situations.7 There are multiple authors who focus on UN peace operations in general and 
they will be discussed first. There are fewer authors who focus on Sierra Leone before, 
after, and during the UN intervention. These authors and their research will be discussed 
in more detail.  
The importance of establishing security as a foundation for rebuilding state 
institutions is a theme throughout these analyses of peacekeeping missions. Some have 
argued that outside guarantees are critical to a peace process. Barbara Walter finds that 
peace settlements, demobilization, and disarming are much more likely to last when 
                                                 
5 Virginia Page Fortna, Does Peacekeeping Work?: Shaping Belligerents’ Choices After Civil War 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 16; Doyle and Sambanis, Making War and Building Peace: 
United Nations Peace Operations, 131–132. 
6 Paul F. Diehl and J. Michael Greig, “The Peacekeeping–Peacemaking Dilemma,” International 
Studies Quarterly 49 (2005): 643. 
7 Robert C. Orr, Winning the Peace: an American Strategy for Post-conflict Reconstruction 
(Washington, DC: CSIS Press, 2004), 11; Paris, At War’s End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict, 19; 
Doyle and Sambanis, Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations, 338–342. 
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guaranteed by an outside party and backed by the credible threat of force.8 Without this 
guarantee it is too risky for them to give up their own military force.9 This suggests that 
providing a credible force on the ground is necessary, but does not give clear guidance as 
to what it are supposed to do once deployed.  
There has been considerable debate as to whether UN forces should be neutral or 
impartial and what exactly those terms mean in regard to peace operations. A neutral 
force is one that will not take sides in a dispute. An impartial force does not favor one 
party over the other, but will intervene if necessary. Traditional UN operations were 
shaped around three key concepts: the consent of all parties, minimum use of force as a 
last resort or in self-defense, and impartiality.10 Some have noted that as international 
norms have changed, what is considered permissible in peace operations has also 
changed.11 The UN and the international community have been increasingly pressured to 
intervene in disputes where all parties have not yet reached a viable peace agreement or 
cease fire. Some have argued that attempting to maintain impartiality in an active conflict 
has the effect of prolonging the conflict.12 They also conclude that in the absence of 
consent a mission cannot be both limited and impartial and still achieve success.13 This 
suggests that the force should clearly align itself with one side and follow a more 
aggressive strategy when confronted with a peace enforcement rather than peacekeeping 
mission. Another aspect of this debate is whether or not the force truly understands 
whether it is to be neutral or impartial, active or passive. If the focus is on maintaining 
consent and limiting the use of force then the mandate of impartiality effectively changes 
                                                 
8 Barbara F. Walter, “The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement,” International Organization 51, no. 
3 (Summer 1997): 336. 
9 Barbara F. Walter, Committing to Peace: the Successful Settlement of Civil War (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2002), 3. 
10 Dominick Donald, “Neutral is Not Impartial: The Confusing Legacy of Traditional Peace 
Operations Thinking,” Armed Forces and Society 29, no. 3 (Spring 2003): 415. 
11 Martha Finnemore, “Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention,” In Peter J. Katzenstein, 
ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1996), 181. 
12 Richard K. Betts, “The Delusion of Impartial Intervention,” Foreign Affaris 73, no. 6 
(November/December 1994): 32. 
13 Ibid., 21. 
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to something much more like neutrality, limiting its effectiveness.14 This suggests that 
what the force believes its mandate to be is as important as what the security council 
intends it to be. 
Several authors address how peacekeepers are supposed to affect the conflict 
environment. Michael Doyle and Lise Morje Howard come close to addressing the 
question of strategy. Doyle agrees that peacekeeping “reduces the opportunity for 
insurgency and enhances incentives for peace,” but adds that peacekeeping is only as 
credible as the mandate allows.15 He maintains that matching the mandate to the political 
and military conditions in the country is the most important contributor to success, adding 
that the mandate must be well executed to be effective, and that peacekeepers must be 
able to adapt to the conditions of the particular conflict in which they are involved.16 
Howard echoes this need for adaptation, stressing first level learning, or the ability of the 
force to adapt to the situation on the ground.17 However, neither discusses specific 
strategies for specific political and military conditions.  
Virginia Page Fortna comes closer to discussing details of the strategies 
peacekeepers should use on the ground. Fortna argues that peacekeepers change the 
incentives of the combatant parties, prevent the hijacking of the political process, mitigate 
accidental violations of the peace agreement, and serve as a source of trusted information 
for all sides – in addition to providing security. This is done either by acting as a credible 
threat to any party that breaks the peace, or serving as a tripwire force that will bring a 
credible force in if threatened. By providing security, the peacekeepers create a safe 
environment that will allow moderate leaders to emerge.18 Using peacekeepers as 
mediators and to ensure security could be considered a strategy implemented by the UN. 
Sierra Leone was one area where the UN attempted to use this strategy. 
                                                 
14 Dominick Donald, “Neutral is Not Impartial: The Confusing Legacy of Traditional Peace 
Operations Thinking,” 435. 
15 Doyle and Sambanis, Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations, 49. 
16 Ibid., 303. 
17 Howard, UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars, 328. 
18 Fortna, Does Peacekeeping Work?: Shaping Belligerents’ Choices After Civil War, 16; Doyle and 
Sambanis, Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations, 49–50. 
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The poor performance of the early UN operation in Sierra Leone has been blamed 
on a range of factors including leadership, organization, equipment and resources, 
political will, and mandate. These factors contributed to an overall lack of security. There 
is a clear consensus that the UN failed to provide adequate security for itself or the 
population. Rebels, renegades, and militias continued to operate throughout the country 
with impunity, culminating in May of 2000, when the UN lost control of the entire 
country and was nearly overrun as it fell back to the capital.19 This led the UN to 
implement a new strategy resulting in a dramatic turnaround: violence greatly decreased 
and a new peace agreement and ceasefire were signed.20  
There are several overlapping explanations of the turnaround. Many scholars 
credit the British intervention. This camp points to Britain’s use of force,21 leadership, 
and/or support to the UN operation as key causal factors.22 A significant increase in UN 
force size in conjunction with British support has also been suggested as a multivariate 
explanation.23 Another camp argues that organizational learning and internal changes in 
the UN operation were the keys to success.24  
Some such as Adebajo and Fortna believe that a series of complex mutually 
reinforcing factors led to the end of the civil war. Adebajo conducted a detailed study of 
the Sierra Leone civil war and has concluded that six changes led to peace. First, the 
Guineans inflicted heavy casualties on the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in cross-
border operations. Second, denial of access to the diamond trade weakened the RUF. 
Third, international pressure on Libya, Liberia, and Burkina Faso cut off their support of 
the RUF. Fourth, better funding and a clear enforcement mandate strengthened United 
                                                 
19 Doyle and Sambanis, Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations, 318; 
Adebajo and Keen, “Sierra Leone,” 261; Paris, At War’s End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict; Fortna, 
Does Peacekeeping Work? : Shaping Belligerents’ Choices After Civil War, 137–138. 
20 Berman and Labonte, “Sierra Leone,” 161, 200–204. 
21 Doyle and Sambanis, Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations, 318; 
Fortna, Does Peacekeeping Work? : Shaping Belligerents’ Choices After Civil War, 138. 
22 Oliver Ramsbotham, Tom Woodhouse, and Hugh Mall, Contemporary Conflict Resolution 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005), 153. 
23 Paris, At War’s End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict, 222–223; Fortna, Does Peacekeeping 
Work? : Shaping Belligerents’ Choices After Civil War, 124. 
24 Howard, UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars, 306. 
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Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL). Fifth, the British destruction of the West 
Side Boys and training of a new Sierra Leone Army (SLA) improved security, and sixth, 
many in the rebel movement became war weary and the loss of Sankoh further cut their 
motivation to fight.25 While these factors appear to be beneficial and mutually 
supporting, they may do a better job of explaining how a lasting peace was reached than 
how the sudden increase in security happened. Fortna also believes that several factors 
led to peace in Sierra Leone. These included internal fracturing of the RUF, decreased 
support for the RUF from Charles Taylor, attacks on the RUF by other actors, and the UN 
mission’s newfound ability to deter aggression.26 Many of Fortna’s factors overlap 
Adebajo’s, but unlike Adebajo, Fortna places considerable emphasis on the UN’s ability 
to deter. She places some credit for this on the more aggressive mandate as does Adebajo, 
but she also credits a shift in strategy on the ground including a willingness to fight when 
necessary. She also states that the British intervention increased the UN’s deterrent effect, 
because they were now backed up by an “over the horizon force.”27  
The pace and timing of the turnaround rule out many of these explanations. 
Denial of the diamond trade was not mandated until July 2000 and cutting off direct 
support would have taken longer to affect the situation on the ground than was actually 
the case. A change in UN leadership also does not seem to be a plausible explanation, 
since Lieutenant-General Daniel Opande did not replace Jetley as the Force Commander 
until November, by which time the turnaround was nearly complete. Similarly, 
organizational changes were begun in September, but were not fully implemented until 
later in the year, too late to explain the turnaround.28 The Guinean assault similarly came 
too late to have contributed significantly to the turnaround.29 Changes in resources and 
                                                 
25 Adebajo and Keen, “ Sierra Leone,” 265–267. Eric Berman also echos most of these causes. 
Berman and Labonte, “ Sierra Leone,” 202. 
26 Fortna, Does Peacekeeping Work? : Shaping Belligerents’ Choices After Civil War, 137–139. 
27 Fortna, Does Peacekeeping Work? : Shaping Belligerents’ Choices After Civil War, 138. 
28 United Nations, Seventh Report on the Secretary General on theUnited Nations Mission in Sierra 
Leone, Report, New York: United Nations, October 31, 2000; United Nations, Report of the Security 
Council Mission to Sierra Leone, Report, New York: United Nations, October 16, 2000. 
29 United Nations, Seventh Report on the Secretary General on theUnited Nations Mission in Sierra 
Leone; United Nations, Eighth Report on the Secretary General on theUnited Nations Mission in Sierra 
Leone, Report, New York: United Nations, December 15, 2000. 
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equipment are not a likely cause, since the most significant increases occurred after the 
security situation changed. The Security Council sent a mission to Sierra Leone in 
October to investigate UNAMSIL’s problems. The investigation still found logistical 
shortfalls and inadequately equipped military units.30  
Some possible explanations remain that should be considered more closely. 
Changes in troop levels may have correlated to changes in the security level, but did not 
appear to drive them. At the lowest point in early May of 2000, the force bottomed out at 
about 8,700 and only reached 9,495 by mid-May, when the initial crisis had abated. 
Between May and August the force increased to 12,440. Between August and December 
2000, the UN force numbered between 12,400 and 12,500. In early 2001, the force 
dropped back to 10,300 again with no security repercussions. The force did not rise above 
12,500 again until mid-2001 and did not peak until it topped 16,000 late in 2001.31 
Clearly, the crisis occurred and ended before most of the troop buildup took effect, but 
perhaps there was a significant enough change in troop levels between May and 
December to warrant further investigation. Troop levels and density, in addition to how 
they were used and where they were deployed need to be investigated further as possible 
explanatory factors.  
                                                 
30 United Nations, Report of the Security Council Mission to Sierra Leone, Report, New York: United 
Nations, October 16, 2000.  
31 All numbers are from the Fourth through Twelfth UN Report on the Secretary General on the 
United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone. United Nations, Fourth Report on the Secretary General on 
theUnited Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, Report, New York: United Nations, May 19, 2000; United 
Nations, Fifth Report on the Secretary General on theUnited Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, Report, New 
York: United Nations, July 31, 2000;United Nations, Sixth Report on the Secretary General on theUnited 
Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, Report, New York: United Nations, August 24, 2000; United Nations, 
Seventh Report on the Secretary General on theUnited Nations Mission in Sierra Leone; United Nations, 
Eighth Report on the Secretary General on theUnited Nations Mission in Sierra Leone; United Nations, 
Ninth Report on the Secretary General on theUnited Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, Report, New York: 
United Nations, March 14, 2001; United Nations Tenth Report on the Secretary General on theUnited 
Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, Report, New York: United Nations, June 25, 2001; United Nations, 
Eleventh Report on the Secretary General on theUnited Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, Report, New 
York: United Nations, September 7, 2001; United Nations, Twelfth Report on the Secretary General on 
theUnited Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, Report, New York: United Nations, December 13, 2001. 
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The change in mandate in August also could have been a factor.32 The original 
mandate was under Chapter VII, but was written as a peacekeeping rather than peace 
enforcement operation.33 In August, the mandate was changed by UNSCR 1313, which 
was very strongly worded and explicitly spelled out the expectations for the force on the 
ground.34 The mandate change could be considered a factor if it could be closely 
correlated with a change in security, but changing interpretations of the mandate may 
have had a more direct effect as the force was already operating under a stronger 
mandate, UNSCR 1289, as of February 2000.35 How this mandate was interpreted does 
warrant further study, especially in regard to Fortna’s statements about a changed attitude 
and strategy.  
The UK’s support of UNAMSIL and the Sierra Leone Army has been widely 
accepted as a critical factor in the turnaround, but this support was not the only factor. 
British troops safeguarded parts of the capital and the airport at Lungi during the crisis.36 
The UK task force represented an over the horizon force and did act to free their own 
captured troops from the Westside Boys, but did not conduct operations against the RUF 
outside of the capital and Lungi areas.37 The British provided command and control 
support, logistical support, and valuable advice to the UN force during and in the weeks 
after the crisis. While the British supported the UN force, the UN’s actions at the tactical 
level still determined whether or not they were respected and viewed as credible by the 
                                                 
32 Numerous sources have identified the original mandate as being insufficient and based upon the 
assumption that the force would be monitoring and assisting with a cease-fire agreement between 
competent and well intentioned parties. These include Adebajo and Keen, “Sierra Leone,” 265–267; 
Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, and Mall, Contemporary Conflict Resolution, 152; Berman and Labonte, “ 
Sierra Leone,” 202.  
No source has identified the more aggressive mandate as the sole reason for the turnaround.  
33 United Nations, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1270, Resolution, New York: United 
Nations, October 22, 1999. 
34 United Nations, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1313, Resolution, New York: United 
Nations, August 4, 2000. 
35 United Nations, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1289, Resolution, New York: United 
Nations, February 4, 2000. UNSCR 1289 was stronger than 1270, but all were under Chapter VII. 
36 Olonisakin, Funmi. Peacekeeping in Sierra Leone: The Story of UNAMSIL. Boulder: Lynne 
Rienner, 2008, 63–65. 
37 Lansana Gberie, A Dirty War in West Africa (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005), 174. 
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rebels. This credibility was crucial as it was the UN force that would guarantee the safety 
of the RUF and AFRC once they began to disarm in 2001. This thesis will examine the 
strategy of the UN force in the time leading up to the crisis and the early days of the 
turnaround. 
D. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
The hypothesis is that the shift to a more aggressive peace enforcement strategy 
was a significant factor in the UN turnaround in Sierra Leone, as the actual conditions on 
the ground were not yet conducive to peacekeeping. In order to function effectively in 
this environment and later be effective in peacekeeping, the UN force had to change its 
strategy and tactics. I will show that the UN’s own actions on the ground in the weeks 
after the crisis were critical to establishing credibility. Once the UN force started 
considering its situation from a tactical and operational point of view it took actions that 
gained it credibility. 
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
In order to determine how the UN mission gained credibility and show that 
increased credibility led to the reestablishment of security, I use process-tracing of UN 
peacekeeping operations in Sierra Leone in the summer of 2000 in order to determine 
what changes most directly coincided with the turnaround of the operation. I focus on 
operational and tactical changes in three areas: the location, distribution, and density of 
the security force; the force’s organizational and physical capabilities; and the force’s 
response to threats and acts of violence. I will determine which changes in these factors 
most closely correlated with changes in security, specifically attacks on the UN force and 
the government of Sierra Leone. Evidence is drawn from primary sources, such as UN 
reports, newspaper and magazine articles, and status reports from watchdog groups and 
think tanks, as well as secondary sources.  
 10
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
Following the first introductory chapter, Chapter II will analyze the security 
situation in the months leading up to the crisis. It shows how and why UNAMSIL 
initially failed to establish credibility as a peacekeeping force and how this led to the 
crisis in early May 2000. The argument is that the UN based its original mandate, 
strategy, operational plans and posture on the Lomé Peace Accord, despite clear evidence 
that the conditions envisioned in the accord would not exist. It then failed to adjust 
adequately to the reality on the ground and thus failed to deter aggression. This failure to 
establish credibility or deter aggression led directly to the crisis. The third chapter shows 
that in response to the crisis, UNAMSIL made fundamental changes at the strategic and 
tactical levels that established its credibility and deterred attacks. Soon after the crisis 
UNAMSIL began to consider the conditions on the ground first when making plans, 
leading to new priorities, objectives, and tactics. This led UNAMSIL to change the 
disposition of its troops to better secure itself and the government controlled areas, and to 
resist RUF advances and retake key territory when necessary. Additional troops and 
organizational improvements enabled it to defeat the RUF militarily when necessary. 
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II. THE CRISIS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter shows that UNAMSIL based its original mandate, strategy, 
operational plans and posture on the Lomé Peace Accord despite clear evidence that the 
conditions envisioned in the accord would not exist. It then failed to adjust adequately to 
the reality on the ground thereby failing to establish its credibility, which in turn 
undermined its ability to deter aggression. This failure manifested itself through a series 
of attacks that increased in frequency and severity with each failure to react 
appropriately. 
By the 1990s, the Sierra Leone state was nearly collapsed. Economic decline in 
the 1970s led to financial ruin and the deterioration of most state institutions. The army 
was both oversized and starved for resources, leading to its institutional weakness and 
disloyalty. Military coups in 1985, 1992 and 1996 led to further state deterioration.38 
Civil war began in 1991, when the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), led by former 
corporal Foday Sankoh, invaded from Liberia.39 Sankoh and many other early members 
of the RUF received training in guerilla warfare in Libya and Burkina Faso, alongside 
Charles Taylor and his National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL).40 The RUF was 
supported by Taylor, Libya and Burkina Faso throughout the war, which was crucial in 
its acquiring arms by selling diamonds.41 The expressed goal of the RUF was the 
overthrow of the government, but control of the diamond areas was its primary 
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objective.42 It controlled all or some of the diamond mining areas throughout the war, 
which provided a key source of funding and in incentive to keep fighting, even as its 
harsh treatment of the people alienated the local population. In 1997, the newly elected 
government of Ahmed Tejan Kabbah was overthrown by a faction of the army, which 
installed itself in power as the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) and invited 
the RUF to join its government. An implosion of authority followed. 
In response, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) 
deployed the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) to reverse the coup and support 
the elected government against its own army and the RUF, which were increasingly 
difficult to distinguish from one another.43 ECOMOG’s tactics were very aggressive, but 
ultimately only partially effective. Kabbah was restored to power in March 1998, after 
which the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) was led by Maxwell Khobe, the Nigerian general in 
charge of the ECOMOG mission. As Chief of the Defense Staff, General Khobe was 
charged with defending the Sierra Leone government and re-building the SLA.44 The 
AFRC was split from the SLA, pushed out of Freetown, and became a rebel group 
aligned with the RUF, operating mostly in the north while the RUF continued to hold the 
eastern diamond areas. The AFRC/RUF alliance launched a surprise offensive in 
December 1998, nearly taking Freetown from ECOMOG and the SLA before being 
beaten back. In February 1999, Nigeria transitioned from military to democratic rule, and 
its new president, Olesegun Obasanjo, informed all interested parties that Nigerian forces, 
which comprised 90% of ECOMOG, would be withdrawn from Sierra Leone within 
months. The United States, Nigeria, Guinea, and others sought a negotiated settlement 
between a weak Kabbah government and a still strong RUF in anticipation of the 
withdrawal.45  
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The result was the Lomé Peace Accord, which left the RUF in a very good 
position. There was a blanket amnesty. The RUF, which was to transition to a political 
party, received four guaranteed ministerial positions and four deputy ministerial 
positions. Foday Sankoh was made vice president and chair of the Commission for the 
Management of Strategic Resources, National Reconstruction, and Development 
(CMRDD). This put him in control of the official diamond trade. In addition, Lomé 
placed few constraints on the RUF. It created multi-level monitoring organizations, 
including the Cease-fire Monitoring Committee (CMC) at the provincial and district 
level, the Joint Monitoring Committee (JMC) at the national level, and the Joint 
Implementation Committee (JIC) at the international level (headed by ECOWAS).46 But 
it did not provide a mechanism for punishing cheating, which was rife. Under the 
agreement an ECOMOG/UN peacekeeping force was to assist the government in 
executing a disarmament program, which was to begin within six weeks of the signing of 
the agreement—an unreasonable schedule. ECOMOG, even though it had publicly stated 
it would withdraw, was tasked with peacekeeping, security of the state and protecting UN 
personnel involved in the DDR process.47 The RUF was in a strong position to win 
elections by persuading voters that this was the only way to stop the killing (as the NPFL 
had done in Liberia in 1997), which required it to maintain its war fighting capability in 
violation of Lomé.  
When the Lomé Peace Accords were signed in July 1999, the security situation in 
Sierra Leone was chaotic. The remnants of the SLA officially numbered 7,000, but its 
actual effective size was difficult to determine. The Civil Defence Force (CDF), 
numbering 15,000, had congealed from village level civil defense forces that emerged 
spontaneously during the war. Its leader, Chief Hinga Norman, had been named Deputy 
Defense Minister by the Kabbah government.48 The AFRC numbered 6,000, and was still 
                                                 
46 The Government of the Republic of Sierra Leone, Peace Agreement Between The Government Of 
Sierra Leone and The Revolutionary United Front Of Sierra Leone. http://www.sierra-
leone.org/lomeaccord.html. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Accord Sierra Leone Project, Paying the Price: the Sierra Leone Peace Process,  
 (Accord issue 9, 2000), London, 2000. http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/sierra-leone/profiles.php.  
 14
concentrated in the north. The RUF numbered 15,000 and still controlled the diamond 
mining areas of the east, putting it in a good position to continue diamond and weapons 
smuggling. The government controlled only the western area around the capital. 
ECOMOG had drawn down to approximately 10,000 troops in the capital area and the 
south with no firm agreement to remain.49  
B. CREATING UNAMSIL 
While the UN, U.S., and UK all played roles in negotiating the Lomé agreement 
and approving the follow on UNAMSIL force, there were near fatal disconnects between 
the agreement that was signed, ECOMOG’s planned withdrawal, and the follow on UN 
mission. When Lomé was signed, there was uncertainty over Nigeria’s continued role and 
by extension ECOMOG’s continued existence.50 The U.S. believed that ECOMOG could 
be much more forceful than a UN force and hence better able to provide security, and 
many in the U.S. government thought Obasanjo could be persuaded to continue Nigerian 
participation with financial incentives.51 Lomé also called for ECOWAS to send troops 
from two more countries within 30 days. Since the chairman of ECOWAS, Gnassingbe 
Eyadema, headed the Lomé peace conference, and representatives from ECOWAS 
nations including President Obasanjo participated in the negotiations and signed as 
witnesses, there was reason to hope ECOMOG would remain until the country had 
stabilized. The UK took a different view. It believed that a UN force was necessary and 
ECOMOG was not capable of restoring peace.52 The U.S., UK, and UN were under 
considerable public pressure to do something about Sierra Leone.53 The UNSC assumed 
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ECOMOG would continue to provide security as called for in Lomé when it approved the 
mandate creating UNAMSIL. The stabilization plan laid out in Lomé partially explains 
this assumption. The plan was very optimistic and relied on the rapid influx of money and 
people as well as the full cooperation of the belligerents. Two more ECOMOG units were 
to deploy within 30 days. ECOMOG was to have a new mandate within 31 days and 
begin phased withdrawals as new SLA units were able to take over from them. DDR was 
to begin immediately and complete in 60 days.54 Ideally this would mean that there 
would be no more large armed groups that would require a large force to deter. If events 
went as planned, there would be no problem. 
UNAMSIL was conceived as a tool to support Lomé. The mission’s physical 
makeup and concept of operations (CONOPS) were shaped by the peace agreement. The 
UN Secretary General (UNSG), Kofi Annan described UNAMSIL’s mission in August 
1999: 
The main purpose of the United Nations force would be to assist the 
Government in carrying out its programme to disarm and demobilize all 
former Combatants and thereafter to help create the conditions of 
confidence and stability required for the smooth implementation of the 
peace process. The United Nations force would not be mandated to ensure 
the security of Freetown and the international airport at Lungi or to 
provide protection for the Government. Those vital tasks, as well as any 
operations against rogue elements unwilling to participate in the peace 
process, are expected to remain the responsibility of ECOMOG.55 
The original force as presented by the UNSG consisted of 6 infantry battalions 
and a 200 man Quick Reaction Force (QRF). Each infantry battalion was to protect a 
DDR Center and its associated reception centers.56 Deployment sites were based on the 
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location of DDR camps, which were determined by the government of Sierra Leone.57 
The National Committee on Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (NCDDR) 
was created to oversee this process. The government’s DDR strategy was to build and 
complete the DDR process in the combatants’ core areas.58 Accordingly, camps were 
established at Lungi, Port Loko, Daru, Kenema, Makeni and Magburaka by January 
2000.59 The camps at Makeni, Magburaka, Kenema, and Daru were especially deep in 
rebel territory.  
The initial UNAMSIL deployment was to Lungi, Port Loko, Lunsar, Masiaka, 
Makeni, Magburaka, Kenema and Daru.60 Six of these eight initial sites were DDR 
locations. Only Lunsar and Masiaka were guarded for military reasons. These were key 
road junctions between Makeni-Magburaka and Port Loko-Lungi. The UN force size and 
its deployment in battalion or smaller units deep into rebel territory were driven by DDR 
requirements in Lomé and the assumption that ECOMOG would be persuaded to fill the 
role defined for it in the agreement.  
C. ACTUAL CONDITIONS 
Before and during the initial deployment there were indications that the 
assumptions UNAMSIL was based upon were not correct. Between July 1999, when 
Lomé was signed, and November 1999, when UNAMSIL began deploying, events on the 
ground did not go as expected. Additional ECOMOG troops failed to materialize and 
Nigeria could not be convinced to stay. On August 19, 1999, President Obasanjo wrote to 
the UNSG that he planned to withdraw 2,000 Nigerian troops per month beginning 
immediately and ending in December, virtually eliminating the Nigerian presence.61 The 
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first Nigerian troops left on August 31, after which Kabbah persuaded Obasanjo to 
suspend the drawdown until October.62 Nigeria expressed a willingness to provide troops 
for UNAMSIL, and the UN planned to absorb other ECOMOG troops as well. But these 
troops would be part of the UNAMSIL force, bound by the UNAMSIL mandate, not 
security providers. Despite clear evidence that ECOMOG would be going away, the 
Security Council issued UNSCR 1270 in October 1999, establishing a UNAMSIL 
mandate that mirrored the UNSG’s CONOPS from September and assumed a large 
ECOMOG security force.63 In early January 2000 two Nigerian battalions transferred to 
UNAMSIL and two more withdrew. Nigeria planned to withdraw two more in late 
January and the rest by the end of February.64 The remaining ECOMOG forces were  
also on track to withdraw by the end of February. In mid-January, ECOMOG forces  
had dropped to 4792 and UNAMSIL had deployed 5 of 6 battalions for a total of  
4,819 troops. Nigeria delayed its remaining drawdown and loaned UNAMSIL two 
infantry battalions and a tank company for 90 days to give the UN more time to stand 
up.65 
During the first three months of the UNAMSIL deployment, conditions on the 
ground continued to deteriorate as ECOMOG withdrew. The plan envisioned in Lomé 
was no longer possible. For reasons that remain unclear UNAMSIL did not re-evaluate its 
plans in light of these problems, instead proceeding with its original plan. During the 
initial UNAMSIL deployment, the RUF preyed upon people that entered its territory and 
did not honor the provisions in Lomé that guaranteed freedom of movement to 
ECOMOG, the UN, and humanitarian groups. In November the RUF denied UNAMSIL 
and ECOMOG access to RUF-controlled territory to perform cease-fire monitoring 
duties. It also briefly detained UNAMSIL patrols at Segbwema and Buedu and warned 
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that no movement could take place without its permission.66 Sam Bockarie, a regional 
RUF leader, stated on November 29th that UN peacekeepers were not welcome in his 
territory.67 On December 6, the RUF detained two members of Doctors Without Borders 
in Buedu for 10 days.68 
From January to March, the detentions and blocking of movement continued as 
UNAMSIL units began to replace withdrawing ECOMOG units. On January 5, 2000 a 
Kenyan Battalion was blocked by the RUF from deploying to Makeni. After an armed 
standoff, the Kenyans withdrew.69 Detentions grew more serious when on January 10 the 
RUF ambushed a Guinean ECOMOG convoy and took vehicles, weapons and 
ammunition. On January 18, it disarmed and detained another 14 ECOMOG troops who 
were supporting a humanitarian NGO convoy. On January 31, another group of Kenyan 
troops were ambushed, disarmed, and detained near Makeni.70 On February 23, a convoy 
of Indian troops trying to move from Kenema to Daru was stopped by a large group of 
heavily armed RUF forces. The convoy was reinforced by Ghanaian troops and the 
standoff continued for two days before the convoy returned to Kenema.71 On February 29 
RUF members refused to let a UN helicopter land at Magburaka.72 On March 7, the RUF 
again detained several NGO employees near Alikalia.73 In early to mid-March, RUF 
rebels blocked several efforts by Indian UNAMSIL troops to get patrols through to 
Kailahun. These incidents were all clear violations of the terms of Lomé.  
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The RUF also engaged in a series of attacks to expand and defend the territory 
under its control. In October 1999, it took Makeni, Lunsar, and Rogberi from the 
AFRC.74 When serious fighting broke out between the RUF and AFRC in Bafodia and 
Kabal in March 2000, ECOMOG had been reduced to a skeletal presence.75 (The last 
troops left Freetown at the end of April.) UNAMSIL sent two Kenyan platoons to de-
escalate the confrontation, but fighting continued intermittently for a week until the 
AFRC was defeated, its commander agreeing to disarmament and relocation to Lungi.76 
The UN had failed in de-escalating the violence or preserving the balance between the 
forces. This was a serious victory for the RUF, which now controlled the north as well as 
the east. Rather than preparing for demobilization, the RUF was strengthening its 
position. 
These violations of the peace accord demonstrated several things. First, the RUF 
clash with the AFRC in the north demonstrated willingness to continue expanding and 
gaining more territory, which was explicitly banned in Lomé. Second, the RUF would not 
shy away from confrontation with UNAMSIL. Third, the UN had no freedom of 
movement anywhere in the east. Simply put, the sections of the Lomé Peace Accords that 
guaranteed security and freedom of movement were being ignored. More troubling than 
the RUF’s lack of commitment to Lomé was UNAMSIL’s inability to stand up to the 
RUF. It was showing that there was no price to challenging the UN. 
The aggressive DDR program spelled out in Lomé and the original UNAMSIL 
CONOPS did not go as planned either. There was no rapid, willing demobilization. The 
Sierra Leone government and the UN began to meet increasing resistance from the RUF. 
The RUF consistently interfered with or blocked DDR attempts in its territory. In the first 
two months that it was open, the Daru site (in RUF controlled territory) had no 
participation as RUF leader Sam Bockarie ordered RUF not to disarm and the CDF 
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refused to disarm if the RUF did not.77 On April 22, 40 armed RUF members 
demonstrated against DDR in Makeni. The rebels also set up a checkpoint near the DDR 
camp (that was removed later due to UN pressure). RUF harassment of local DDR 
employees forced them to leave the camp. On April 22 in Magburaka 20 armed RUF 
prevented UNAMSIL observers from entering the DDR reception center.78 As of May 
2000, 24,042 troops had been disarmed: 4,949 RUF, 10,055 ex-SLA and 9,038 CDF. 
This shifted the balance of armed groups in favor of the RUF. Only 10,840 total weapons 
had been turned in, many of low quality.79 This shows that the RUF was intentionally 
keeping its fighting strength up while its opponents became weaker. 
D. FAILURE TO CHANGE UNAMSIL 
As the RUF ceasefire violations piled up and provided warnings that there was no 
peace to keep, UNAMSIL remained focused on getting back on the track laid out in 
Lomé. It dedicated significant time and attention to the establishment and staffing of the 
various bodies created by Lomé, and attended several regional meetings whose main 
purpose was to develop plans to get Lomé back on track and to urge combatants to 
cooperate. The UN continued to see its purpose as providing security for DDR and 
implementing the political and human rights aspects of Lomé, believing that a successful 
DDR program would lead to de-escalation and then stabilization. It saw the reformed 
SLA as ultimately responsible for state security and UNAMSIL as a temporary expedient 
that would be withdrawn after elections.80 In his report on March 7, 2000, the Secretary-
General reiterated what he considered the UNAMSIL role: 
One of the main priorities for the United Nations in Sierra Leone remains the 
speedy establishment of a credible peacekeeping presence throughout the country 
to create the necessary climate of confidence and security conditions for the 
implementation of various aspects of the peace process. UNAMSIL and the 
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Secretariat are doing everything possible to accelerate the attainment of this 
objective and the Sierra Leonean parties, in particular RUF, must provide their 
full cooperation to UNAMSIL and unconditional access to all parts of the 
country. It should be borne in mind that the deployment of UNAMSIL is not a 
goal in itself, nor is it directed against or designed to favour one party. Through 
the security it provides, UNAMSIL is to create the conditions for all Sierra 
Leonean parties to disarm and bring national reconciliation and the peace process 
to a successful conclusion.81 
The UN saw challenges and detention by the RUF as misunderstandings or 
aberrations that would go away, not part of a trend or testing of resolve. The UN did not 
seek to aggressively establish its credibility and ability to deter threats. It instead sought 
to use engagement and pressure to convince the RUF to follow the Lomé agreement. The 
JMC issued strong statements condemning the ceasefire violations. Adeniji also made 
public statements condemning the violations. Regional leaders were prevailed upon to 
exert pressure on the rebel leadership. The UN also ensured that the CMCs had AFRC 
and RUF members added quickly in an effort to win acceptance for them.82 After the 
RUF detained the Guineans and stole their equipment, UNAMSIL, ECOMOG, and 
members of the national DDR commission pressured Sankoh to return the equipment. 
Sankoh initially agreed, but later claimed that the RUF had not taken anything.83 The 
general UNAMSIL response to illegal roadblocks and detentions at this time was to avoid 
confrontation, withdraw if possible, and surrender rather than fight. These methods 
appear to have done little to discourage defiance from the RUF; in fact they encouraged it 
as future events would demonstrate. 
A robust ECOMOG force acting aggressively had been necessary to defend 
Freetown from the AFRC/RUF attack in 1999. The aggressive ECOMOG counterattack 
had been a major factor in pushing the RUF back to where Lomé was possible. 
ECOMOG had taken tremendous casualties and fought fiercely. After Lomé, and both 
before and during the UNAMSIL standup, ECOMOG troops had been challenged and 
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had shown a willingness to fight back even while taking casualties.84 The UN, on the 
other hand, had given the RUF reason to believe that it would always choose to withdraw 
when challenged. Deterrence evaporated as ECOWAS withdrew. 
The UN responded to the ECOMOG drawdown by assuming some of its duties, 
but not its full role. The Secretary-General requested that UNAMSIL be increased to 
10,000 troops and the mandate expanded to “assume the functions now performed by 
ECOMOG, in particular the provision of security at Lungi airport and at key installations, 
buildings and government institutions in and around Freetown.”85 In his report of January 
2000, the Secretary-General discussed other ECOMOG tasks that UNAMSIL would be 
expected to carry out including increased security responsibilities at DDR sites, weapons 
destruction, and assisting in “the free circulation of people and goods and the delivery of 
humanitarian assistance along selected key roads.”86 The Secretary General added 
however that “these tasks would not fundamentally change the nature of the mandate, 
which is based on the requirement in article XVI of the Lomé Agreement for a neutral 
peacekeeping force.”87 He also added later that UNAMSIL would “be expected to 
continue to function with the cooperation of the parties.”88 These proposed mandate 
changes show that while UNAMSIL was to get larger and take on some ECOMOG tasks, 
the UN still viewed the purpose as neutral peacekeeping in an environment with consent. 
This was very different from what ECOMOG had been doing before Lomé, which was 
peacemaking. 
The new mandate adopted in February increased troop strength, as requested, and 
included provisions to “provide security at key locations and Government buildings, in 
particular in Freetown, important intersections and major airports, including Lungi 
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airport” and “facilitate the free flow of people, goods and humanitarian assistance along 
specified thoroughfares.”89 The secretary-general’s request to include extensive and 
frequent patrols was not granted. Nothing in the new mandate was nearly as strong as the 
ECOWAS requirement to ““maintain the peace and security of the Sierra Leonean 
State.”90 The CONOPS presented by the Secretary-General called for 12 infantry 
battalions distributed in four sectors, Freetown, Lungi/Port Loko, 
Makeni/Magburaka/Koidu, and Bo/Kenema/Kailahun. Each battalion would be primarily 
responsible for the DDR sites and the lines of communication in their sector. This would 
essentially make 6,000 troops responsible for the key RUF areas in the north and east and 
another 6,000 responsible for the west. Given the experience of ECOMOG, this would 
only be sufficient if the rebels cooperated. The UN’s entire strategy was based upon hope 
that Lomé would hold and there would be a peace to keep. 
The UN force was consistently noted for being under-trained, under-equipped, 
and logistically weak.91 By the time the last ECOMOG troops departed on May 2, 2000, 
the UNAMSIL force was over 8,000.92 The UN footprint continued to grow as 
ECOMOG was replaced by UNAMSIL at Mange and Kambia and UNAMSIL pushed 
out to Kabala in the North, Joru near the Liberian border, and Kailahun in the far east 
near the Guinean border.93 UNAMSIL was unable to establish a presence in the Kono 
district, but did make successful patrols to Koidu. By May the approximately 8,000 UN 
troops were spread across 17 sites throughout the country. The UN was numerically 
inferior to the RUF and had demonstrated an inability to move about freely. This meant 
that if it was attacked in force, it was unlikely to be able to get reinforcements or supplies 
to isolated troops. Command and control was also inadequate for a force spread over the 
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whole country.94 Until May, none of the troops except the Indians were capable of 
operating effectively on their own.95 Despite this, it pushed forward with peacekeeping 
plans that would leave them more exposed. 
The UN believed that the presence of peacekeepers would allow DDR to proceed 
and de-escalate the conflict. There were several warnings that the RUF saw its presence 
as a threat. Sankoh’s and Bockarie’s earlier statements had shown this. The RUF’s 
continued resistance to the UNAMSIL deployment to these areas and to DDR should 
have been a warning that further deployment was not likely to be tolerated. UNAMSIL 
had tried unsuccessfully to deploy to Koidu several times and some patrols there 
eventually. The month before the crisis started, Jetley publicly stated that his goal was to 
establish a permanent UNAMSIL presence at Koidu in the Kono district.96 Sankoh 
warned UNAMSIL that he would consider this deployment a provocation.97 In military 
terms the diamond producing terms were the center of gravity of the RUF. The diamonds 
were used to purchase weapons, supplies, and other goods needed to fund their 
operations.98 Securing these areas and disarming the RUF forces there would be a death 
blow to the RUF as a fighting force. Even without explicit warnings, Jetley and the 
UNAMSIL leadership should have understood that the RUF would fight hardest to 
defend these areas. Despite these warnings the UN did not treat deploying to Kailahun 
and Kono as a decisive engagement. Jetley’s insistence on following the strictest 
interpretation of the mandate and deploying to the whole country immediately preceded 
and likely caused the crisis. 
Several factors contributed to the UN’s cognitive dissonance in regard to their 
plans in Sierra Leone and the situation on the ground. A combination of wishful thinking, 
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inertia, and internal dysfunction slowed recognition of the severity of the situation and 
the proper response. The secretary general’s reports on the mission were for the most part 
optimistic. It appears the staff at headquarters was either unwilling to admit publicly that 
they had misjudged the situation, or was not being given accurate information to make a 
good decision. The UN had formed UNAMSIL out of military units that were 
volunteered by member states. Public admission of failure or the need to shift to a 
peacemaking mission might result in troops being withdrawn. By making smaller 
changes to the mandate, the UN was trying to allow the mission to find a way to succeed 
without committing itself to a much more serious course of action it might not have 
support for. 
As far as the military units in the field, UNAMSIL was conceived as a 
peacekeeping operation and troops were sent by their countries to carry out that specific 
mission. This could account for a serious level of inertia and hesitancy to respond to 
threats with force. The commanders of the individual units must have been aware that 
they were assigned to UNAMSIL temporarily, but their career was in their own armed 
forces. There would be little motivation to expand their mission and take losses without 
explicit instructions from home. 
Between March and August 2000, a comprehensive review of United Nations 
Peace Operations was conducted. The resultant product, the Brahimi report, identified 
several issues with the leadership and decision making of UNAMSIL. The report referred 
to command and control problems with UNAMSIL including troops that did not 
understand or respect the integrated chain of command or understand standard operating 
procedures and rules of engagement. This report also called on “national capitals to 
refrain from instructing their contingent commanders on operational matters.”99  
The UNAMSIL command staff also suffered from internal divisions. In the midst 
of the crisis, Jetley wrote a confidential memo to the UN leadership in which he was 
extremely critical of the Nigerians in general including not only the troops assigned to 
UNAMSI but also, the SRSG, Adeniji, and the Deputy Force Commander (DFC), 
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Brigadier-General Mohamed Garba.100 Jetley explicitly accused the SRSG and DFC of 
sabotaging the peace process and attempting to make him look bad. Whether these 
accusations are true, they demonstrate that at the time of the crisis UNAMSIL suffered 
from serious divisions and dysfunction. The timing of this memo suggests that it was 
intended to deflect blame or excuse poor decisions made by Jetley. Jetley did not lead the 
UNAMSIL troops effectively and the UNAMSIL leadership was not able to function as a 
coherent military staff. External communications and reports point to a staff that was 
fixated upon a set of milestones and frustrated by internal division and dysfunction. This 
organization was not likely to effectively learn or adapt as necessary. Given the obvious 
split between the three key leadership positions in UNAMSIL, the Secretary General may 
not have fully understood how great the danger was on the ground. 
In July 2000, after the crisis had abated a high level investigation was conducted 
by Manfred Eisele.101 The original Eisele Report was never published, but the internal 
investigation Eisele conducted and the subsequent discussions among senior UN 
Secretariat and Security Council staff led to a wholesale re-organization of the mission in 
which numerous personnel resigned or were fired.102 In September of 2000, the Jetley 
memo was leaked to the Guardian, damaging relationships between the UN, Nigeria, 
India and the other troop contributing countries.103 The most important consequence of 
the Eisele Report and the Jetley memo was the decision of India to withdraw its troops, 
including Jetley.104  
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E. THE CRISIS 
The UN’s inappropriate strategy and ineffective adaptation caught up with it 
when the final ECOMOG troops withdrew. The crisis began when a group of RUF 
fighters demanded that the Makeni DDR center turn over five RUF members and the UN 
disarmament personnel that had received them. The UNAMSIL troops would not let the 
RUF fighters into the camp and tried to engage them in talks. The RUF group became 
violent and detained three UN observers and four Kenyan peacekeepers, destroyed part of 
Makeni camp and looted the town. At the same time in Magburaka, a group of armed 
RUF troops surrounded the UNAMSIL site and its Kenyan peacekeepers.105  
On May 2, as the last ECOMOG troops departed, the crisis escalated and spread 
to the east. At Makeni, the RUF attacked the Kenyan troops, wounding two. It also 
attacked and overran the Makeni DDR camp while 60 Kenyans were inside. The Kenyans 
fled and the camp was looted and destroyed.106 The RUF also tried to disarm UNAMSIL 
troops at Magburaka. Both sides exchanged fire all day. The RUF fired small arms, 
RPGs, and mortars at the Kenyan troops, injuring three. It looted and destroyed the DDR 
camp at Magburaka.107 Trouble also began in the east on May 2. The RUF detained a UN 
helicopter and passengers at Kailahun; four crew members and two civilian staff were 
taken prisoner. Near Kailahun it set up a roadblock and detained 30 UN personnel. A 23 
man Indian unit on the way from Daru to Kailahun was also detained near Kuiva.108 
Beginning May 2, there were constant minor clashes throughout the north at Makeni, 
Magburaka, Lunsar, Port Loko, Rogberi Junction, Masiaka, Mange, Kambia, Songo, and 
mile 91.109 On May 3, the trouble continued. A Nigerian UN company was fired on in 
Kambia by the RUF. The Nigerians were detained and released on May 4 after being 
                                                 








stripped of their weapons and uniforms. A Nigerian platoon was also fired on and 
surrounded at Mange.110  
In the face of the sudden and overwhelming onslaught, the force commander tried 
to reinforce the positions that were under siege. The Kenyan company was brought back 
from Kabala to reinforce Makeni and a 100 man Indian unit was sent to Magburaka.111 
One attempted reinforcement went terribly wrong. The newly arrived Zambian Battalion 
was ordered to go to Makeni to reinforce that position. The Zambian convoy was stopped 
at a RUF roadblock and the entire 426 man convoy including part of the Kenyan 
headquarters that was travelling with them was taken prisoner.112 On May 8, the Nigerian 
and Guinean troops charged with securing Masiaka were involved in a 4 hour long gun 
battle with the RUF, before being forced to withdraw when they ran out of ammunition. 
The road back to Freetown also had rebels on it and the troops had to withdraw to Bo.  
Engagement and pressure would again be the UN’s only immediate option. The 
UNAMSIL Force Commander, Jetley, asked Sankoh to release UNAMSIL personnel; he 
refused, accusing the UN of trying to start a war by forcibly disarming the RUF. 
President Kabbah asked Mike Lamin, a senior RUF leader, to persuade Sankoh to 
cooperate, but Sankoh made himself unavailable.113 The UNSG called for Sankoh to 
return to the peace process,114 and contacted regional leaders for help in convincing 
Sankoh to free the prisoners and return to the peace process. Between May 3 and 7, 
representatives from Liberia, Libya, Mali, and Nigeria met with Sankoh at the request of 
the UN.115 On May 4, Sankoh denied that the RUF was holding any UN personnel.116 On 
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May 5 and 6, Mr. Oluyemi Adeniji, the Secretary General’s Special Representative 
(SRSG) met with Sankoh personally. Sankoh claimed that UNAMSIL started the crisis 
by forcing RUF fighters to disarm. Adeniji and the Libyan representative convinced 
Sankoh to read a public statement asking for the RUF to cease the attacks and release the 
detainees.117 On May 5, Sankoh also ordered the release of the captured helicopter and 
six UN personnel.118 On May 8, the Mano River Union and ECOWAS leaders attended a 
special summit where the attacks on the UN were condemned. The leaders called on 
Charles Taylor to personally work for the return of the detainees and the RUF’s return to 
the peace process.119 All of this diplomatic maneuvering produced very little: 6 personnel 
and a helicopter were released, but over 500 UN personnel and a large amount of 
weapons and vehicles remained in RUF hands.  
Numerous interviews and news reports indicated that the people had lost 
confidence in UNAMSIL.120 During the first week of May, citizens of Sierra Leone, and 
residents of the Freetown in particular, were afraid that the RUF would take over the 
country. There was little confidence in the UN’s ability to it or protect the people. On 
May 6 the UN lost contact with several units on the main road to the Freetown peninsula 
from the east within 20km of the capital and mistakenly assumed they had been overrun. 
When it announced this, there was panic in the streets.121  
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On May 8, 40,000 protesters marched on Sankoh’s house to protest what they 
thought was his attempt to take over the country. The protest was organized partially by 
members of parliament, but was composed of citizens of Freetown, ex-SLA, Kamajors, 
and regular people.122 Many were calling for Sankoh and the RUF to be disarmed by 
force.123 Rocks were thrown and the 75 UN troops guarding the house fired into the air to 
try to disperse the crowd. The RUF guards inside the house then fired into the crowd with 
automatic weapons and RPGs, killing 19 and wounding 40.124 Armed men in the crowd 
then fired back. Sankoh fled and the crowd overran the house and killed several 
bodyguards.125 The police who responded found evidence that Sankoh had been selling 
diamonds illegally and buying weapons. There was enough evidence in the hose for the 
police to arrest Mike Lamin and other RUF leaders in Freetown.126 Everyone but the UN 
had run out of patience with the RUF’s delays and blocking of the DDR program and 
wanted it forcibly disarmed. There was no more peace to keep and UNAMSIL would not 
be trusted until something changed.  
F. CONCLUSION  
From the initial UNAMSIL deployment through May 8, 2000, the UN followed a 
strategy of neutral peacekeeping as if they had the consent of all sides. Despite many 
statements and acts by the RUF demonstrating a lack of consent, unwillingness to disarm, 
and unwillingness to follow the peace deal, the UN maintained this strategy. Separation 
of the combatants and rapid voluntary disarmament were the primary goals. Violations of 
the ceasefire were addressed using engagement, diplomacy, and pressure from regional 
leaders, not action. These methods failed and UNAMSIL lost credibility each time their 
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troops were disarmed or turned back. To the individual RUF fighter and their leadership 
on the ground it appeared as if there were no repercussions from challenging the UN. The 
defiance and aggression of the RUF escalated as UNAMSIL failed to exact any kind of 
cost for cheating on the Lomé agreement.  
UNAMSIL leadership used poor judgment in planning and executing operations 
with a force that was unwilling or unable to carry it out. They attempted to execute a 
strategy that relied upon consent that was lacking. They expanded in a way that would 
lead to violence, but did not prepare accordingly. This strategy was not changed until the 
RUF resumed open warfare and the state itself was threatened. Perhaps a new strategy 
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III. THE RESPONSE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In response to the crisis, UNAMSIL made fundamental changes at the strategic 
and tactical levels in response to realities on the ground, which established its credibility 
and ability to deter attacks. It changed the mission from peacekeeping to peace 
enforcement, and its alignment from neutral to pro-government. Its tactics and response 
to threats and hostile acts also became more aggressive as it focused on securing itself 
and government controlled areas, resisting RUF advances, and retaking key territory 
when necessary. The UN had considerable help from the UK, but these internal changes 
ultimately established the UN’s credibility, which contributed to its success.  
B. IMMEDIATE RESPONSE 
The UN’s immediate response to the crisis was to withdraw to a defensible area, 
to cooperate with all parties defending the capital area, and to respond to aggression with 
force. These changes would later be reflected in the UN’s official revised strategy. On 
May 9, UNAMSIL found itself with 8,700 troops spread around Sierra Leone under 
assault by 15,000 armed RUF.127 Its immediate reaction was to consolidate troops in safe 
locations. All troops that were able withdrew to Freetown to avoid being taken hostage. 
The Indian units at Kailahun remained surrounded by RUF, but not under attack; they 
held their ground successfully for months.128 
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Britain sent a large task force to Sierra Leone, Operation Palliser, with the stated 
goal of protecting and evacuating UK, Commonwealth, and EU citizens. The 800-man  
1st Battalion of the Parachute Regiment arrived on May 8 and 9.129 A six-ship naval task 
force that included an aircraft carrier equipped with attack planes and a helicopter carrier 
arrived on May 14.130 The UK Foreign Minister allowed that securing the Lungi and west 
Freetown areas to evacuate EU citizens would also help additional UN troops arrive 
safely.131 On May 11, with the evacuation complete, the British were still controlling 
access to the west side of Freetown where the UN was located and appeared to be 
actively defending the Freetown area.132 UK and UN troops had also acted together to 
bolster the defense of the approaches to Freetown such as Hastings and Waterloo.133 The 
UN then asked the British to stay on and assist the peacekeeping force.134 They agreed to 
stay until mid-June, when the UN force would be fully reinforced, and Operation 
Palliser’s mission was formally broadened to include securing the Lungi airport while the 
UN force was built up and providing technical and logistical support to UNAMSIL.135  
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C. A NEW ALIGNMENT 
The single greatest change the UN made after the crisis was a shift in alignment 
from impartiality to supporting the government. Although this shift would not be 
formalized until later, the effects were immediate in terms of actions and results. A key 
aspect of this shift was a move away from attempting to demobilize the AFRC and 
Kamajors to aligning with them against the RUF. The May assault on the capital led to 
the creation of a pro-government coalition comprised of ex-SLA, AFRC, and CDF 
forces. The coalition was led by President Kabbah, CDF leader Chief Hinga Norman, and 
former AFRC leader Johnny Paul Koroma, all of whom saw their positions threatened by 
the fall of Freetown to the RUF. On May 9, ex-SLA/AFRC and CDF forces began 
rearming and were seen heading east out of Freetown. Truckloads of Kamajors were 
again seen headed east toward Masiaka on May 10.136 By May 11, the road to Freetown 
was secured, but there was heavy fighting 10 miles east of Waterloo where the Jordanians 
and Nigerians were.137 At this point the UN, SLA, and Kamajors were cooperating to 
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manning checkpoints together.138 This three-day period marked the turn of the UN 
mission from peacekeeping to peace enforcement. 
This new focus became more formalized as the RUF was stopped and pushed 
back. On the night of May 12, the UN, British, and all pro-government forces held a 
meeting to decide what to do next.139 With their helicopters, jets, and robust 
communications equipment, the British brought capabilities the government of Sierra 
Leone and UNAMSIL had been lacking. By May 13, the British were helping to 
coordinate the actions of the UN and the pro-government groups.140 The pro-government 
forces were making progress in retaking lost territory, advancing 30 miles in a day. By 
May 14, pro-government forces were fighting the RUF around Masiaka and the rebels 
had begun to withdraw.141 By May 15, the situation around Freetown was stable with no 
RUF threat to the capital.142 
While the British provided leadership and security inside the capital and at the 
airport, UNAMSIL and the local pro-government forces would be responsible for the rest 
of the country. These forces soon proved willing and able to defend themselves and 
reinforce positions that were under attack outside of the Freetown area as well. Early on 
May 11, RUF attacked the UN at Port Loko using captured armored cars, but the UN 
troops were prepared and suffered no casualties.143 On May 12, the RUF attacked Mile 
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91 from two sides, but the UN troops supported by Kamajors were able to defeat the 
rebels after a three hour fight.144  
The shift to a peacemaking role in support of the government also effectively 
changed the force level. While precise numbers of CDR and former AFRC fighting 
alongside UNAMSIL are not known, they had combined for over 20,000 troops when 
Lomé was signed and were by all reports were clearly significant in the short period of 
time after the crisis. In many ways the situation resembled 1998 when the Nigerian led 
ECOMOG had worked with the Kamajors to push back the RUF and SLA. For this 
period of time the UN was not the sole peacekeeping force, but was part of a larger 
peacemaking force. These changes simultaneous changes in mission and force level make 
a direct analysis of the impact of a changing force size on security difficult.  
On 13 May, the Joint Implementation Committee met in Freetown to discuss the 
situation and the response. Representatives from the governments of Sierra Leone, Mali, 
Liberia, Ghana, Guinea, Libya, the U.S., the UK, and UNAMSIL attended. The strategy 
decided upon by the committee was to be a dual path approach. All parties would work to 
apply diplomatic pressure on the RUF while UNAMSIL would be enhanced to show 
military strength.145 This strategy would be used with only slight modifications until the 
end of the war.  
In his report issued on May 19, Secretary-General Kofi Annan officially changed 
UNAMSIL from a peacekeeping to a peacemaking operation. Annan explained that 
UNAMSIL’s initial plan had been based on “the cooperation of the parties and a 
generally permissive environment.”146 Since those conditions did not exist, the UN’s goal 
should be “the restoration of conditions conducive to a resumption of the peace 
process.”147 Annan then laid out UNAMSIL’s new concept of operations (CONOPS). 
                                                 
144 “Rebels Halt Advance on Freetown.” BBC News, May 12, 2000, accessed June 28, 2010, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/745706.stm. 
145 United Nations. Fourth Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra 
Leone. 




UNAMSIL should be immediately reinforced to 13,000 troops to defend Lungi, 
Freetown, and strategic locations in the west and south. UNAMSIL should later expand 
“with sufficient strength to stabilize the situation in Sierra Leone.”148 Required military 
strength based upon the RUF’s use of guerilla tactics and the challenging terrain in the 
country. The secretary-general’s guidance was to “deploy with due care and preparation, 
in sufficient numbers and backed up by adequate military means to deter attacks and, if 
necessary, respond decisively to any hostile action or intent.”149 UNAMSIL had always 
had a right to self-defense, but this was the first time that deterrence and response to 
hostile intent had been added.  
The details of the CONOPS sent a strong signal about the UN’s resolve in Sierra 
Leone, even if they did call for troops and equipment that were not available at the time. 
The new operation would have two phases. First, UNAMSIL would consolidate units at 
Lungi, Freetown, and key locations on the roads to the capital. The purpose would be to 
protect the government institutions and civilians in Freetown and to deter RUF attacks on 
other areas under government control. Next, UNAMSIL would “stabilize the situation in 
the country and assist the Government to restore law and order in the areas outside the 
control of the RUF.”150 In order to do this, UNAMSIL would need to add troops and 
equipment before gradually expanding to strategic locations in the west and south such as 
Port Loko, Rogberi Junction, Masiaka, Mile 91, Moyamba, Kenema, and Daru. In order 
to pursue the second phase, UNAMSIL would add a two infantry battalions, artillery, 
helicopters, patrol boats, as well as support units such as logistics, communications, 
intelligence, medical, and command. UNAMSIL’s total strength would be 15 infantry 
battalions and 16,500 personnel.151 An important point of emphasis in the new CONOPS 
was periodic review and modification to the UN’s plan based upon progress made and the 
conditions on the ground. Periodic review would allow UNAMSIL to be more nimble 
and refine their strategy as changing conditions dictated.  
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It is noteworthy that the mandate UNAMSIL operated under had not yet changed 
and would not change until August. The secretary general found space within the existing 
mandate for these CONOPS. This lends credence to the argument that mandate 
interpretation is as important as the mandate itself. 
D. RESULTS 
During the initial recovery from the crisis, UNAMSIL acted differently than 
before. Threats were no longer met with attempts at de-escalation. It no longer 
surrendered if confronted. Although there was an initial increase in violence, it soon died 
down. This is in contrast to the escalating violence that followed every act of weakness 
leading up to the crisis. At this stage, the mandate remained the same; the only thing that 
changed was how UNAMSAL leadership on the ground interpreted and acted under the 
existing mandate. Alignment with the government and willingness to fight back when 
challenged are closely correlated to the end of RUF attacks. From late May to early July, 
the pro-government coalition fought to retake territory captured by the RUF during the 
crisis and the RUF responded with counterattacks on the pro-government coalition and 
UNAMSIL. UNAMSIL defended itself effectively and re-took lost ground when the RUF 
pushed the pro-government forces back. On May 3, the RUF drove the SLA out of 
Rogberi, but UNAMSIL re-took the town with a robust counterattack on June 2.152 Pro-
government forces capitalized on the RUF defeat and advanced to Lunsar by June 7.153 
The RUF attacked the Kenyans at Kabala on June 6th. The Kenyans successfully 
defended themselves with no casualties. This unit was later withdrawn because 
UNAMSIL would be unable to reinforce it in the event of further attacks, a sound 
military decision.154 On May 30, the RUF ambushed a convoy escorted by the 
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Jordanians. One Jordanian was killed and four wounded, but in contrast to earlier 
incidents, the Jordanians responded with force and killed almost all of the attackers.155 
In late June, a splinter group of the AFRC, the Westside Boys, attacked pro-
government forces holding Masiaka and erected roadblocks on the roads leading to the 
town. The RUF then attacked in force, taking the town on July 3. UNAMSIL 
counterattacked and re-took the town the following day,156 demonstrating that it was not 
only as willing to fight as the other pro-government forces, but also more capable. This 
engagement was less than 60 days after the nadir of the crisis and was the last time the 
RUF took territory from the pro-government coalition and/or UNAMSIL. 
UNAMSIL still had one major military challenge: freeing the troops that had been 
surrounded at Kailahun since May 15.157 It had been permitted to re-supply them 
initially, but in early July the RUF took a harder line and stopped resupply helicopters. 
UNAMSIL responded on July 15 by launching Operation Khukri, a robust and well-
coordinated operation. First, it removed all non-combatant personnel from Kailahun in a 
well-timed helicopter evacuation. The troops in the UNAMSIL compound then forced 
their way through the surrounding rebels with the support of helicopter gunships. They 
later linked up with a relief column that had moved up from Daru. In the process of 
returning to safety at Daru the UNAMSIL column destroyed a RUF brigade headquarters 
in Pendembu and confiscated a considerable amount of military equipment. In the course 
of the operation, UNAMSIL lost one person while the RUF had very heavy casualties.158 
Operation Khukri accomplished its stated goals of maintaining freedom of movement and 
security for UN personnel, but it also demonstrated that UNAMSIL had considerable war 
making capabilities and would use force on a large scale when threatened. Khukri 
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combined with the smaller engagements between May and July showed that there was 
now a serious price to be paid for challenging UNAMSIL. Deterrence was in place. After 
Operation Khukri, the UN was never seriously threatened by the RUF again.  
In October the RUF began to indicate to UNAMSIL and ECOWAS that it was 
interested in returning to a peace process. The RUF and the government of Sierra Leone 
signed a ceasefire in Abuja on November 10, 2000.159 Unlike earlier cease-fires, this one 
was permanent.  
The improved credibility of UNAMSIL forces was apparent between November 
2000 and February 2001 when the Indian and Jordanian contingent withdrew and 
UNAMSIL conducted a Relief in Place (RIP) of these units. This operation required 
3,151 Indian and 1,817 Jordanians to be withdrawn in phases and replaced with troops 
from other countries. The operation was well executed and there was no breakdown in 
security despite a temporary decrease in the overall UNAMSIL strength from 12,510 in 
late October 2000 to 9,756 in March 2001.160 Five months before, UNAMSIL’s relief of 
ECOMOG had led to the crisis. That the RUF did not choose to attack during this time 
suggests that it no longer thought it could beat UNAMSIL in a fight. If troop levels had 
been more important than credibility, RUF attacks on the UN and the government would 
be expected to increase at this time. 
Between January and March 2001, the RUF allowed UNAMSIL to conduct 
patrols along routes it had previous closed. UNAMSIL also revised its CONOPS to 
gradually increase its footprint as new areas were opened to them. It did not establish 
camps in these areas immediately. First, it conducted very strong patrols. Next, it 
increased the frequency of the patrols. Later, it sent out patrols to make overnight stays. 
Finally, when it and the RUF had developed confidence that the UN could provide 
security and the RUF would not commit hostile acts UNAMSIL established permanent 
sites in preparation for DDR. 
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In May 2001, the government and the RUF agreed that the CDF and RUF should 
disarm simultaneously in one or two districts at a time. UNAMSIL would operate the 
DDR centers and see that all parties were safe. DDR re-started in Kambia and Port Loko 
on May 18, 2001, barely a year after the crisis ended. By the end of December the DDR 
process was complete and nearly 40,000 people had been processed.161  
By the end of 2001, UNAMSIL had deployed to all of Sierra Leone and had 
successfully provided security for the demobilization of the RUF and the CDF. The 
government of Sierra Leone had begun to extend its authority to districts that had been 
under RUF control for years. Although Sierra Leone was far from a strong state it had 
been stabilized enough to begin improving. After a near disaster in May of 2000, 
UNAMSIL had come back and become a success story. 
E. CONCLUSION 
Given the addition of unknown and irregular numbers of CDR and former AFRC 
forces on the government’s side after the crisis and the radical shift in the mission, 
isolating and analyzing the effect of troop levels on security is difficult. This is further 
complicated by the change from peacekeeping to peacemaking and back. What can be 
shown is that after the UN had shown it was credible they were able to reduce troop 
levels temporarily and not attract attacks. If the large number of pro-government forces 
had solely been responsible for the security turnaround those same forces would not have 
trusted the UN to protect them when they later disarmed and demobilized. 
While other factors contributed to the turnaround, the UN’s change in strategy 
and tactics in May of 2000 was vital to its increased credibility and the turnaround. UN at 
the time of the crisis did not have the ability to be a deterrent even in a limited area. 
When the UN realized it faced rebels who were not ready to disarm and were willing to 
fight to defend territory, the UN began to think of the situation in a military light and 
made better strategic and tactical decisions. After UNAMSIL had proven it could 
withstand attacks or even take the initiative and destroy RUF strongpoints they greatly 
increased the cost and risk of attacking UN positions and better enabled themselves to 
protect the areas they occupied. In military terms, UNAMSIL was a force in being. 
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Whether or not it fought the RUF, the RUF would have to beat it to win. Since the RUF 
realized it could no longer beat UNAMSIL, it had to find other options, peace being the 
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IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. SUMMARY 
UNAMSIL is a unique case in that it was created to fill a gap left by a regional 
force that could no longer guarantee security. While the mission was created to support 
Lomé, Lomé itself was created because ECOMOG planned to withdraw. The U.S., a key 
UNSC member, was instrumental in pushing the RUF and government of Sierra Leone 
into an agreement that they were not ready for, helped frame that agreement to include a 
UN force, and pushed the Secretariat to execute.162 The SG and his staff attempted to pull 
together a mission to operate in this uncertain environment while trying to persuade 
Nigeria and ECOMOG to stay, as called for in Lomé. From the start the strategy was 
based upon hope that ECOMOG would stay to provide security or that the RUF would 
hold to a peace agreement that was seen as overly generous to it. The mission was created 
from forces that had been volunteered for a peacekeeping mission, not peacemaking. The 
initial concept of operations was centered on supporting rapid voluntary disarmament and 
demobilization.  
In the early months of the mission, the actual conditions on the ground moved 
further and further away from those in which the mission was created to operate. 
ECOMOG followed through with its withdrawal, and the RUF did not comply with the 
Lomé agreement. The UNSC responded by authorizing a size increase for UNAMSIL 
and changing its mandate to increase UN responsibility for security, without making 
security the primary focus. The UNAMSIL staff failed to recognize the seriousness of 
warning signs and threats from the RUF and remained focused on meeting earlier 
milestones. The troops failed to provide effective security at DDR sites, could not move 
freely throughout the country, and did not respond aggressively to threats. These failures 
cost the UN credibility with the local population and the RUF. A dysfunctional 
UNAMSIL staff did not adapt to the rapidly changing conditions or recognize the 
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imminent threat of the full resumption of civil war. The mission leadership and the 
individual components of the force failed to respond adequately to the threat. The 
situation deteriorated further as the last ECOMOG troops departed leading to the crisis in 
which hundreds of UNAMSIL troops were captured and the capital area was nearly 
overrun.  
The crisis sparked a dramatic change in UNAMSIL’s strategy. The UNAMSIL 
staff and UNSG both recognized that peacemaking, not peacekeeping was required. The 
UN aligned itself with the government of Sierra Leone and cooperated in a coalition with 
other local forces and the British. UNAMSIL’s primary focus became security of its own 
forces and the capital area. The entire UNAMSIL force from top to bottom became aware 
of the magnitude of the changed conditions and responded accordingly. The force’s 
response to aggression and threats changed dramatically. UNAMSIL units that were 
attacked fought back and won, in some cases taking back lost ground. UNAMSIL 
conducted a well planned and executed military operation to relieve a trapped unit and 
effectively destroyed a major rebel headquarter in the process. After these actions RUF 
violence against UNAMSIL stopped. The UN achieved these results with the same force 
and under the same mandate that it had at the start of the crisis; the difference was in the 
strategy and tactics used.  
B. PEACE OPERATIONS 
The findings of this study shed light for our understanding of how peacekeeping 
works, both from a theoretical as well as a policy perspective. As a case study, 
UNAMSIL raises questions about the theoretical hypotheses posed by Virginia Page 
Fortna in Does Peacekeeping Work.163 According to Fortna, peacekeeping works by 
changing the incentives of recent belligerents; reducing uncertainty and fear about the 
future; preventing accidents; and preventing political abuses from the parties involved. In 
practice, however, UNAMSIL failed to achieve those functions. The mission did little to 
change the incentives of the parties involved since the mission did not establish itself as 
credible threat to the RUF. Similarly, the peace process was eventually hijacked since 
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RUF constantly violated the terms of the peace agreement, while the UN did little to 
punish those violations. This allowed it to attempt to hijack the political process as Taylor 
had in Liberia by blocking progress toward peace and terrorizing the population until 
they lost hope and accepted that letting him take over was better than continuing the war 
indefinitely. UNAMISIL did not serve as a source of credible information as RUF 
continued to have gain influence by using violence to control even more territory.  In 
sum, peacekeeping in Sierra Leona did not work as it was intended by the UN and its 
supporters. Certainly, the fact that the UN mission did not work according to 
conventional theoretical expectations does not mean that the operation itself was a 
complete failure. Instead, the case here analyzed suggests that researchers and students of 
peacekeeping in general need to take a closer look at negative and critical cases (such as 
Sierra Leone) to better identify the causal mechanisms of peacekeeping. In other words, 
we need more empirical analysis and critical cases to understand how “peacekeeping 
works and when it works.”  
But, was UNAMSIL a complete failure? Again, the empirical evidence here 
analyzed suggests that the mission had an overall mixed success in allowing moderate 
leaders to emerge. Before the crisis, UNAMSIL was not successful. The most extreme 
RUF leaders, such as Bockarie, gained ground and actively prevented their forces from 
demobilizing and becoming a political party. After the crisis and the military defeat of the 
RUF, the most radical and corrupt leaders such as Sankoh, Lamin, and Bockarie were no 
longer in power and more moderate leadership was eventually able to emerge. This 
process took time and was predicated upon the UN keeping the peace they had made. 
This suggests that credibility is crucial to allowing moderates rather than radicals to take 
leadership roles. 
Perhaps the most relevant finding that this study advances is that peacekeeping is 
unlikely to succeed when the belligerents to a conflict continue to have incentives to 
fight. Indeed, UNAMSIL had little opportunity to mitigate accidental violations because 
RUF’s against the mission were deliberate. Treating these deliberate moves as accidents 
flowing from misunderstanding only made matters worse. Obviously, RUF had no 
intention of committing itself to the conditions set up by the peace agreement and had 
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strong incentives to continue fighting, despite the UN’s intervention. In other words, and 
to put Fortna’s theory in perspective, what UNMISL tells us is that success in 
peacekeeping is heavily dependent on the belligerents willingness to support peace 
efforts. Peacekeeping works only when the belligerents are genuinely willing to put their 
weapons aside; this usually happens when the parties to a conflict realize that military 
victory is simply not achievable in the short or long-run.  
A second theoretical assumption common in the literature on peacekeeping argues 
that peaceful settlements require external guarantees and some level of enforcement to 
succeed, since parties often fear becoming vulnerable as a result of demobilization.164 
Was UNAMSIL a successful guarantor of the peace agreement? Again, the evidence 
suggests a mixed bag of good and evil.  
UNAMSIL was initially unsuccessful as an external guarantor of the Lomé 
agreement. From the signing of Lomé up to the crisis there were numerous incidents and 
violence caused by RUF in and around the DDR centers. While the RUF leadership may 
not have intended to disarm in the first place, the AFRC and Kamajors that did. The 
AFRC, Kamajors, and some RUF had initially begun to disarm. After some early success 
DDR slowed. The UNAMSIL response to RUF threats and attacks was to protect those in 
the camps, but not to punish the RUF for breaking the peace. After several incidents the 
individual RUF members stopped reporting to the centers and the AFRC and Kamajors 
became hesitant to demobilize. It was a mistake to only focus on the immediate security 
inside the DDR camps. By not punishing the RUF for breaking the peace, UNAMSIL 
was demonstrating that they could not protect the disarmed combatants in the long term.  
Nevertheless, UNAMSIL did seem to be able to guarantee the agreement after 
enforcement was introduced into the mission’s strategy. Consistent with Walter’s 
analysis, once UNAMSIL had committed to peace enforcement and earned credibility 
fighting the RUF they were much more effective in guaranteeing the final ceasefire and 
providing security when all sides demobilized for good. The UN was clearly on the side 
of the government of Sierra Leone, but had nothing to gain by harming the RUF once 
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they did disarm. They fairly protected all former fighters who abided by the peace 
agreement and DDR was fast and effective the second time. This indeed suggests that 
enforcement is a necessary, yet not sufficient condition for success in peacekeeping, 
especially when the parties to a conflict are not fully committed to the agreement. But the 
findings in this study also suggest that timing and sequencing matter, not just force, in 
determining success. Enforcement often takes time to implement and coordinate; its 
effects are thus diffused and rarely seen in the short-run. 
The UN’s experience in Sierra Leone was especially relevant to the debates 
concerning impartiality vs. neutrality. The on-going debate among scholars of 
peacekeeping is that the UN is more likely to succeed at implementing peace when it 
maintains a neutral and impartial position vis-à-vis the belligerent groups. The perception 
of neutrality is said to assist the UN by providing it with a degree of trust and legitimacy 
vis-à-vis other external actors.165 In opposition to this view, scholars such as Richard K. 
Betts consider that taking sides may be the only option available to the UN, especially if 
the overarching goal is to put an end to a conflict. From Betts perspective, peace is the 
outcome of military victory, in which one side politically and militarily overcomes its 
rivals. How did UNMSIL perform vis-à-vis these two theoretical debates? The study of 
Sierra Leone reinforced the arguments developed by Betts. Lomé was an attempt to 
create a balanced peace by giving the RUF enough that they would not want to continue 
fighting. ECOMOG was supposed to be the force that discouraged the RUF from 
breaking the peace. In ECOMOG’s absence, the UN did not fill that role. UNAMSIL’s 
attempt to act impartially and limit the use of force encouraged the RUF to cheat without 
consequence. The RUF expanded their territory at the expense of the AFRC while in the 
presence of UN troops. The great shift for UNAMSIL came when they chose the 
government of Sierra Leone to be the eventual victor in the war and took actions aimed at 
achieving that goal. These actions earned UNAMSIL credibility and directly altered the 
incentives for the RUF. In sum, much to the chagrin of liberals, the lesson learned from 
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UNAMSIL is that peacekeeping is most likely to achieve its goals when the principles of 
neutrality and impartiality are in fact relaxed or abandoned. 
Thus, far the analysis of UNAMSIL suggests that mission success is externally 
determined by the willingness of the belligerents (such as RUF) and by the level of 
enforcement. Are there any other internal factors, inherent to the UN mission that would 
have made UNAMSIL more successful? Indeed, the case in Sierra Leona suggests that a 
carefully drafted UN mandate would have made a difference. The mandate for 
UNAMSIL did not initially match the conditions in the field. The UNSC failed to 
recognize the needs and conditions in the field and thus mandated the mission with 
unrealistic goals. The revised mandate drafted by New York before the crisis did not 
explicitly go far enough in emphasizing security and deterrence. The UNAMSIL staff 
interpreted the new mandate as traditional peacekeeping when conditions on the ground 
called for peacemaking. After the crisis, the UNSG and the UNAMSIL staff recognized 
the hostility of the RUF and that no peace existed to keep. They interpreted their existing 
mandate to provide security for the government of Sierra Leone as a peacemaking force. 
This suggests that the level of enforcement is determined not just by the mandate, but to a 
degree by the staff and military units assigned to the force. A vaguely worded mandate 
can contribute to the kind of cognitive dissonance noted in chapter II and lead to an 
inappropriate response to aggression. 
There is one final theoretical implication from the UNAMSIL analysis. This study 
suggests that the size and equipment level of a force is not as important to gaining 
credibility as how the force is used and how it reacts when threatened. A large and well 
equipped force that is passive suggests that the UN is not really committed to the mission 
and could be easily discouraged. Recalcitrant combatants might think they can simply 
wait the UN out rather than follow through with demobilization. Combatants that do want 
to disarm are not likely to trust a passive force to protect them, no matter how well 
equipped.  
Given what we know thus far from UNAMSIL, the case suggests two possible 
areas of improvement for peacekeeping. First, establishing credibility early is key. 
Cheating or aggression must be countered quickly and forcefully. In cases where there is 
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no peace to keep and the force is smaller than ideal, they can still be effective if they are 
used with limited goals. A small, but focused force can still secure a strategically 
important area and establish itself as a credible fighting force. That credibility could carry 
over to a larger force to secure a larger area later. 
Second, when preparing for a mission the UN must be realistic about conditions 
on the ground. If there is no peace to keep the mandate, should clearly reflect that 
situation from the start. In this case margin for error is slim and any action must be 
decisive and effective. The force cannot be seen or see itself as neutral or passively 
impartial. In order to avoid the kind of cognitive dissonance and dysfunction that plagued 
UNAMSIL before the crisis the force must understand from top to bottom what the 
mission is and what the strategy is from the start. The states providing the military units 
that the force is composed of would choose the units and their leadership understanding 
what may be required. When the units are deployed they would know what range of 
actions they are expected to take part in and there would be much less of a chance for 
division in the force. In the challenging environment of peacemaking, unity is vital to 
credibility. 
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